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The appraisal of the “market value” of homes serving as the collateral for mort-
gages is a fundamental part of the underwriting process. If a loan should default,
however, it is not the retail market value that the lender obtains, but rather the
“recovery value.” In this research, we show how recovery values differ from
market values at origination and explore the reasons for the differences. Using
a large sample of chattel mortgages on manufactured homes, we explore the
relationship among the selling prices, the book values, and the fitted values
from simple hedonic models with spatial autocorrelation. We then address the
differences between selling prices at origination and recoveries from repos-
sessed homes. We find that the spread between them varies systematically
with home characteristics and especially with “atypicality,” that is, with mea-
sures of how unusual a home is. Selling prices both at origination and recovery
affect borrower defaults.
For decades, property appraisal has been a mainstay of mortgage underwriting
and is an essential element of the verification process for lenders. The appraiser
provides a professional estimate of the value of the property that can be used to
verify that the selling price is representative of current market conditions. The
lender uses the appraisal to assess whether the loan will perform, that is, repay
in full, and whether the loan will be profitable for the lender. But is the simple
point estimate sufficient for assessing the risks associated with the collateral?
Can lenders improve loan decisions with information on the expected second
moment or with estimates of the likely recovery values from a default?
In this research, we explore these issues with a large data set of chattel mortgages
on manufactured homes. Manufactured homes, although little researched, are
an increasingly important segment of the housing market. The Manufactured
Housing Institute reports that 8% of the U.S. population lives in manufactured
homes. In 2001, manufactured homes made up about 15% of residential starts.
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Chattel mortgages, unlike conventional single-family mortgages, are secured
only by the structure or “home” and do not include a lien on the underlying
land. In most cases, the borrower does not own the land. Instead, the land is
either rented from a third-party owner or from the owner of a manufactured
housing “park,” which, like a single-family subdivision, often groups similar
homes in one location.1 In parks, the land leases are usually month-to-month.
The foreclosure or repossession process can be much quicker and simpler for
manufactured homes because the collateral is mobile, albeit at a nontrivial cost.2
At most times, dealers provide a ready market for repossessed units, although
occasionally they are overstocked with inventory and unwilling to provide the
usual level of liquidity to the market.
There are many reasons to question the optimality of existing appraisal proce-
dures for residential mortgages in general and manufactured homes specifically.
First, there may be agency issues in the appraisal process. Appraisers, like all
parties to real estate transactions, are often subjected to pressures or incentives
to shade their estimates so that the transaction will be approved. Loan volume
drives the compensation of many participants in the process and inevitably
colors all of the participants at least indirectly.
There has been a fair amount of recent experimental research investigating
appraisers’ incentives and biases. For example, it has been shown that appraisers
may be influenced by valuations of others (Diaz 1997) and by their own previous
appraisals (Diaz and Wolverton 1998). A number of studies find that clients may
influence the valuations.3
Even more basic to the appraisal process is whether appraisals are unbiased
estimates of market values. It is well known that appraisals lag behind market
movements (Quan and Quigley 1989). Appraisals can also be unbiased but
inaccurate.4
1 It is also possible for units to be placed on owned land and for the lender to have
a lien on both the land and the home. These “land homes,” then, are very similar to
conventional mortgages, but are not included in our data. Other times, manufactured
homes are installed on a permanent foundation and become largely indistinguishable
from traditional “stick” built homes. Loans on these kinds of manufactured homes are
not included in our data.
2 Repossessed units are often wholesaled to dealers and hauled away to the dealer’s
sales lot where they are reconditioned and resold for a profit.
3 See Kinnard, Lenk and Worzala (1997), Levy and Schuck (1999), Wolverton and
Gallimore (1999) and Hansz and Diaz (2001).
4 Cole, Guilkey and Miles (1986) made an ex post comparison of the most recent
independent appraisal to subsequent sales prices of 144 commercial properties and found
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A third issue is whether there is a link between appraisal quality and probability
of default. Lenders use appraisals to help evaluate the probability of default.
Loan-to-value ratios (LTVs) are widely used as a causal variable in statistical
modeling of default probabilities. Noordewier, Harrison and Ramagopal (2001),
using a sample of 1,428 residential loans, find evidence that properties that are
valued above the sales price of “similar and proximate” properties are more
prone to default. However, they conclude that the simple variance of property
values is not related to default. Lacour-Little and Malpezzi (2003) find that
decreasing appraisal quality is associated with an increase in the probability
of default. In addition, they find that over-appraisal is significantly related to
default, while under-appraisal is not. We have been unable to find any studies
of the relationship of point estimates and dispersion estimates of property value
and collateral value, which is ultimately what determines recovery risks.
But are current LTVs, whether based on purchase prices or appraisals, the ap-
propriate driver for default equations? At the time of the default decision, the
borrower will typically be distressed and the relevant value may not be a retail
value. A forced or distressed sale will occur at a reduced price, which may be
more relevant for assessing default probabilities at origination. Liquid properties
where an owner can obtain a quick sale at only a small discount from market
prices may have lower default probabilities because borrowers will be able to
avoid default by selling. If, on the other hand, a property is unusual and difficult
to sell, default may be the best alternative. Therefore, understanding the mar-
ketability and the liquidity of properties may help evaluate loan performance.
It is certainly the case that appraisals are an inappropriate metric for understand-
ing the expected profitability of loans (Guttentag 1992, Capozza and Thomson
2005). Assessing profitability requires that lenders estimate all the future cash
flows on the loan including the recoveries from defaulted loans. For this task,
estimates of the recovery values will be more useful than estimates of the market
value at origination. Therefore, while appraised values, that is, estimates of the
market value at origination, are the most commonly used in underwriting, it may
be that lenders should estimate recovery or wholesale values. If recovery values
are a better predictor of defaults than appraised values, then appraised values
an average absolute difference of about 9%. Using a sample of 500 properties acquired
by corporate relocation firms, Dotzour (1988) found that current appraisal methods were
unbiased estimates of value and that a large part of the variation in appraisal error could
be accounted for with seasonal factors and regional economic conditions. Chinloy, Cho
and Megbolugbe (1997) conclude, using a sample of 3.7 million repeat transactions on
mortgages bought by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, that appraisals are systematically
higher than purchase data. However, a drawback of using sales price to evaluate appraisal
quality is that low appraisals tend to be correlated with rejected loans, and are therefore
not included in the samples.
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are superfluous. If, on the other hand, appraised values are a better predictor
of defaults, then estimates of both market values at origination and recovery
values in default will be needed.
From the borrower perspective, both the appraisal (retail values) and the dis-
tressed or recovery values should be relevant. If the borrower is subject to
financial stress and cannot make payments, the first choice is to sell the prop-
erty to a retail buyer and prepay the loan, thereby salvaging any equity. When
trying to sell to a retail buyer, the liquidity of the property will matter. Illiquid
properties will be less likely to sell, reducing the chance that the borrower can
repay the loan. The difference between the retail value and the recovery value
is a measure of the liquidity of the property similar to the bid–ask spread in
other financial markets. If the property does not sell to a retail buyer, the bor-
rower may be forced into foreclosure. Therefore, there are many moving parts
in the borrower’s decision. Both the appraised value and the estimated recovery
value play a role and should be included in the lender’s assessment of risks and
expected losses.
As part of our analysis, we explore two measures of liquidity and heteroskedas-
ticity in some detail. The first, atypicality, (Haurin 1988) is a measure of how
unusual a unit is relative to an average unit. The second, sparsity, measures the
number of units that have sold recently within a 15-mile radius. Of the two,
atypicality is a more important factor in hetroskedasticity.
In the next section, we describe the data and follow with a discussion of the
methodology. The third section presents the results of our empirical analysis,
which is divided into eight subsections. We first estimate hedonic models of
selling prices that exploit spatial autocorrelation and include our measures of
atypicality and sparsity. The next subsection compares the 1-year forecast per-
formance of the various models and shows that the best models have mean
squared errors (MSEs) of 6–7%. We then compare the results from using the
selling price, the appraised value and the various hedonic models for predicting
recovery values for repossessions and show that the simplest hedonic models
are the best predictors of recoveries. These results suggest that valuation for
recovery is quite different from the valuation of selling prices at origination.
The fourth subsection analyzes the characteristics that are important for the
retail sales (at origination) versus the wholesale prices (recoveries). The fifth
subsection analyzes the forecast errors and shows that atypical units have larger
forecast errors. This suggests that models of automated appraisal should adjust
for atypicality and lenders should incorporate this information into profitability
estimates. The sixth subsection compares models of default that use selling
price, appraisal, automated appraisal and recovery estimates to calculate LTVs.
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In the last subsection we document that both manual appraisals and simple
statistical hedonic or automated appraisals improve the predictions of default
models. Automated and manual appraisals perform about equally well. Esti-
mates of the recovery value also significantly improve risk assessment. The
final section summarizes and concludes.
Data
Our data are a large sample of loans from the manufactured housing industry.
The data include 195,442 observations of manufactured homes at the time
of loan origination and the subsequent recovery information for 9,746 of the
homes that defaulted. All of the homes are located on rented land. Variables in
the origination database include information about the loan:
Sales price = the purchase price (market price) of the home.
Book or appraised value = the book value or appraised value of the home.5
Origination date = the month of loan origination.
Termination date = the final month of data for the loan.
Refinance = a dummy variable indicating that the loan is a refinance of an
existing loan.
Variables also include information about the collateral:
Length = the length of the home.
Width = the width of the home.
Model year = the model year of the home.
ZIP code = ZIP code of the location of the home.
Park = a dummy variable indicating that the home is located in a manufactured
housing park.
Multi-wide home = a dummy variable indicating that the home is multi-wide.
Resale of repossessed home = a dummy variable indicating that the unit was
a former repo.
Manufacturer 1–Manufacturer 13 = dummy variables indicating the manufac-
turer of the home.
If a unit is repossessed and sold, the following data are available:
Repo sale price = the price for which the repossessed unit sold (the second
sales observation).
5 As in the auto lending industry, the collateral value or “book value” is typically esti-
mated from standard industry guides that provide estimates of value based on market,
make, model, year and equipment. Occasionally, however, a full residential appraisal is
done.
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Number of baths = the number of baths in the repossessed unit.
Condition = the physical condition of the repossessed unit.
In addition to the variables in the database, we created several others. The postal
ZIP code data can be assigned a latitude and longitude. From these coordinates
for each sale, we calculated the distance between observations and created a
variable, SPARSITY , which is a measure of proximity to other recent sales.
SPARSITY is the reciprocal of 1 plus the number of sales within a 15-mile
radius during the previous year:
SPARSITYi = 1
1 + Ni (1)
where Ni is the number of sold homes within 15 miles of the ith home. Note
that
SPARSITYi ∈ [0, 1], ∀i, lim
Ni →0




(As the number of home sales near the ith home increases, SPARSITY ap-
proaches 0, and when there are no homes within 15 miles of the ith home, its
value is 1.)
Because new units come with a manufacturer’s invoice price instead of a manual
appraisal, we limit our study to those homes that were previously owned at the
time of origination. Table 1 presents summary statistics for the variables.
To account for the difficulty that arises in valuing homes with unusual features,
we created a variable, ATYPICAL, following the approach outlined in Haurin
(1988). We use implicit marginal prices from a semi-log hedonic regression
of home sales prices on various characteristics to penalize absolute deviations
from the average (see the Appendix for a more complete discussion). Thus, the
weights used to generate the ATYPICAL variable are percentage influences on
value rather than absolute dollar prices.
Results
Hedonic Models with Spatial Autocorrelation
We begin with a standard hedonic regression of the log of real sales price on
the available set of characteristics. The results are presented in Table 2, panel
A, first column. The most significant independent variables include the age
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Table 1  Summary statistics.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Max. Min. N
Sale price $19,757 $10,244 $75,000 $2,300 195,442
Appraised value $21,783 $11,233 $75,000 $1,000 195,442
Latitude 38 5 66 19 193,843
Longitude −92 13 −67 −167 193,843
Age of unit at origination (months) 116 73 408 12 195,442
Model year 1985 6 1999 1963 195,442
Length of unit (feet) 65 10 80 40 195,442
Width of unit (feet) 17 5 40 12 195,442
Repo sale price $10,808 $9,330 $95,000 $200 8,941
Location = park 0.85 1 0 195,442
Multi-wide home 0.24 1 0 195,442
Origination date (1 = January 1987) 101 35 150 1 195,442
Termination date 134 25 150 6 195,442
Loan-to-value at origination 0.89 0.1 1.1 0.2 135,638
Loan term 172 71 360 24 135,638
Loan age 34 25 150 1 195,442
Borrower credit score 650 64 840 430 116,242
Baths per 1,000 SF 1.6 0.4 4.2 0.6 195,442
Baths unknown 0.9 0.2 1.0 0.0 195,442
Spatial lag 9.4 0.3 10.8 8.5 195,442
Sparsity 0.1 0.2 1.0 0.0 195,442
Atypicality 0.5 0.3 1.6 0.1 195,442
Manufacturer 1 0.01 1 0 195,442
Manufacturer 2 0.02 1 0 195,442
Manufacturer 3 0.01 1 0 195,442
Manufacturer 4 0.02 1 0 195,442
Manufacturer 5 0.01 1 0 195,442
Manufacturer 6 0.00 1 0 195,442
Manufacturer 7 0.00 1 0 195,442
Manufacturer 8 0.01 1 0 195,442
Manufacturer 9 0.01 1 0 195,442
Manufacturer 10 0.01 1 0 195,442
Manufacturer 11 0.00 1 0 195,442
Manufacturer 12 0.01 1 0 195,442
Manufacturer 13 0.00 1 0 195,442
Notes: This table displays selected summary statistics for the collateral and the loans.
Variable names are self-explanatory. Missing loan amount data limit the number of
loan-to-value observations to 135,638. Sparsity is defined as 1/(1 + N) where N is
the number of homes sold within 15 miles in the previous year. Atypicality is defined
in Equation (2) in the text. Spatial lag is a weighted sum of the log of sales prices as
defined in Equation (A.1).
of the home, the size of the home and whether the unit is single or multi-
wide. The coefficients indicate that each month a home depreciates by 30 basis
points or 3.6% per year. Each 100 square feet adds 10% to value. For any
given size unit, a multi-wide configuration is worth 35% more. Location in a
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































518 Capozza, Israelsen and Thomson
manufactured housing park is worth 16% more. Extra baths add to value, but are
not highly significant, perhaps because this variable is sparsely populated in the
database. Manufacturer indicator variables were included in all the equations
in Table 2, but are not reported. In the second equation of panel A, we adjust
for spatial autocorrelation by including a weighted average of the surrounding
sales as described in the Appendix. This spatial variable is highly significant
and reduces the MSE. In the third equation of panel A, the SPARSITY and
ATYPICAL variables are included, but not spatial autocorrelation. SPARSITY
and ATYPICAL are significant, but add little to the fit and accuracy of the
model.
In panel B, we present identical regressions but now including state indicator
variables. The addition of the 50 state indicators does improve the fit relative to
panel A. The second equation in panel B shows that spatial autocorrelation is
still an economically important and statistically significant variable even when
state indicators are included.
Out-of-Sample Forecast Performance
In Table 3, we present the results of our test of out-of-sample forecast accuracy
of the eight models in Table 2. We first train the model on an initial sample of
data, and then use the estimates to forecast sales prices 1 year ahead. Each year
the model is “retrained” using an additional year of data. Table 3 displays the
MSEs by year and by model from this experiment.
In each year, the most accurate models include both the state indicators and
the spatial autocorrelation variable. This suggests that local factors play an
important role in the price of manufactured homes. One curious result in Table 3
is the tendency for the MSEs for all the models to become larger over time
despite being trained on extra years of data. This suggests that the prices of
these homes became more disperse and more difficult to explain over time.
The Value of Recovered Units
In Table 4, we begin to explore the relationship between purchase prices and
recovery liquidation prices. We do so by regressing the log of the real recovery
price on one of several estimates of the value of the home at origination—
the actual purchase price, the book or appraised value and six of the hedonic
estimates from Table 2. Also included in each equation are indicator variables for
the condition of the home (poor, fair, good) and for the sales channel (refinance,
wholesale, cash, redemption). The loan age at the time of default is included as
a measure of the depreciation since origination.
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































522 Capozza, Israelsen and Thomson
The most remarkable feature of Table 4 is that the simplest model with the
worst 1-year-ahead forecasting performance in Table 3, the baseline model, is
the most accurate for predicting recovery prices. This suggests that price-setting
behavior in recoveries is quite different from retail pricing at origination. That
is, the characteristics that the buyers of repossessions value are different from
those valued by retail purchasers.
Other coefficients are similar across the equations in Table 4. Condition of the
units has the expected effects, as does sales channel.
Why Does Value Change in a Default?
Table 5a probes the relationship between retail sales and recovery sales fur-
ther by displaying hedonic regressions for retail prices at origination next to
similar equations for recovery prices. Because the homes associated with loans
that default may be different from the entire sample of homes, only the 8,071
observations for which both the origination price and the recovery price are
available are included in Tables 5a–5c. Several items are noteworthy. First, age
is a more important factor in a recovery sale because the implied depreciation
rate is three or more times larger than the recovery sale regressions (−0.01
versus −0.003). Second, there are sign changes on the baths variable. Addi-
tional baths, apparently, are a liability in a recovery. This is consistent with a
world where baths are in poor condition at the time of recovery or even van-
dalized, making rehabilitation costs higher. Third, location in a manufactured
housing park is advantageous for recovered units. Units in parks may be easier
to resell. Fourth, size is more important in recovery. Recovery buyers place
more weight on square footage than retail buyers.
The most remarkable result, however, is the sign flip on atypicality. Unusual
units trade for a premium at origination but for a very large discount in a
recovery. This is very strong evidence of the effect of liquidity on the spread
between origination and recovery prices. Unusual units will be more difficult to
sell and on average be held longer in inventory before a sale. At the retail level,
dealers will want to sell unusual units at a premium to compensate for the greater
inventory expense. On the other hand, at the recovery level, dealers, expecting
to have to hold unusual units for an extended period, will only purchase at a
discount to compensate for the inventory costs.
Cross-Equation Tests for Equality of Coefficients
In Table 6, we test for the significance of the differences between the coefficients
in the retail price (at origination) and the recovery price regressions. Only the



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































526 Capozza, Israelsen and Thomson
8,071 observations for which both origination price and recovery price were
available are included in this table.
The most significant differences are for the depreciation rates (Home Age and
Loan Age) and the unit size (Area). All the coefficient differences are significant
at the usual levels except for Sparsity. These results are additional evidence that
collateral values in a default are very different from values at origination. In
particular, collateral values at default are not a simple additive or multiplicative
transformation of values at origination. Some characteristics are more valuable,
others less. In some cases, characteristics that are an asset at origination become
a liability in a default.
Precision Regressions: What Determines Forecast Error?
Given the findings above that the prices (coefficients) of characteristics can vary
or even change sign depending on the type of sale, we expect that the residuals
from the hedonic regression might be heteroskedastic in one or more of the
characteristics. Atypicality6 is a primary candidate as a possible determinant of
the absolute size of residual errors.
In Table 6, we explore residual variation with Glejser regressions (see Appendix)
of transformed residuals on atypicality and sparsity. In Table 6, we regress
the transformed residuals from the first equation in Table 2 on measures of
atypicality. Atypical (composite) is defined as:
Atypical = |Parea(Area − Area)|
+ |Page(Age − Age)| + |Pwidth(DMulti − Dmulti)| (2)
where Pi are the coefficients from Model 1 in Table 2, and the bars indicate
mean values. Thus, highly atypical homes are units where the weighted sums
of the absolute values of these characteristics are far from their sample means.
The weights are simply the implicit price weights from the Model 1 in Table 2
regression.
The results indicate that most of the explainable residual variation depends on
the Atypical composite variable. Breaking this variable into its components or
adding the sparsity measure does not improve the fit substantially. In the next
6 Goodman and Thibodeau (1998) show that error variance tends to increase with home
age and to length of time between sales, presumably because of an increased likelihood
of undocumented renovations. Accordingly, we include age in our measure of atypicality.











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































528 Capozza, Israelsen and Thomson
section, we use these results to re-estimate selected Table 2 and 5a–c regressions
with weighted least squares (WLS) using Atypical as the weights.
Weighted Least Squares Estimates
Table 5c presents the selected WLS regressions. Weighting the observations
does affect the coefficients, presumably because the WLS estimates are more
efficient. However, the qualitative results and the conclusion remain unchanged.
There are still significant differences between the origination price and the
recovery price coefficients.
Predicting Defaults: Actual Versus Appraisal Versus Hedonic Prices
We have now established definitively that the recovery values are different from
origination values and are not a simple multiplicative transform of origination
values. Lenders attempting to estimate the profitability of a loan, which de-
pends directly on these recovery values rather than the origination values, will
be best served by having estimates of recovery values independent from the ap-
praisal at origination. In this section, we begin to analyze default probabilities
using the various estimates of collateral value. In default equations, important
determinants of loss rates are the initial and the subsequent LTVs (Capozza,
Kazarian and Thomson 1997, 1998). The denominator of LTV is a measure
of the value of the collateral and one would expect that neutral assessments
of property value at origination would improve the power of LTV in a default
equation. For example, we know that transaction prices in real estate are the re-
sult of bargaining between the buyer and the seller. A buyer who obtains a more
favorable price may be less likely to default. Therefore, estimates of collateral
value like a manual appraisal should be better for predicting defaults, because
they should remove the bias from bargaining power.
On the other hand, the default decision, which is made at a later and perhaps
distressed time in the life of the loan, may be driven by the liquidation values
of the property. The recovery estimates should provide a better measure of
recovery values.
Table 7 displays our results on the effect of the various measures of LTV. The
first three columns use the actual purchase price, the manual appraisal price
and the fitted origination price values, respectively, as the denominator in LTV.
The analysis uses logistic regression to estimate the equations. We provide
two measures of fit: pseudo-correlation, which is the correlation between the
actual and the fitted values, and percent concordant that measures the ability of
the models to correctly classify the observations. Both the manual or the book






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































530 Capozza, Israelsen and Thomson
appraisal and the hedonic estimates are slightly better predictors of defaults than
the actual purchase prices as expected. The manual and the hedonic appraisals
are roughly comparable although the concordance is slightly (0.1) higher for
the manual appraisal.
In the penultimate two columns, we add variables that measure whether the
appraisals are below (LTV plus) or above (LTV minus) the purchase price. In
both cases, the results indicate that buyers who pay more than the neutral
appraisal prices default at significantly higher rates. This implies that having a
neutral assessment of the value of the property at origination, whether manual
or book appraisal or statistical appraisal, is indeed beneficial for predicting
defaults.
In the last two columns, we test whether the estimated recovery values affect
the borrowers default decision. Earlier, we presented evidence that atypical
houses sell for lower recovery values. We can also expect atypical houses to
take longer to market for sale. In a default situation, there is a limited time
before the borrower’s equity is foreclosed. Therefore, while the recovery price
is paramount in determining the losses on loans, it may also have an effect on the
default probability. These last two columns are consistent with this hypothesis.
Both the coefficient on the LTV from the origination price hedonic and the LTV
using the recovery price hedonic are highly significant.
These results support the use of appraisals at origination. Both the manual and
the statistical (automated) appraisals improve the predictive power of default
equations. The last result suggests that in addition to retail value appraisals,
lenders would be well served to have estimates of recovery values from a
foreclosure when assessing default probabilities.
Conclusions
In this research, we have explored the relationship among purchase prices,
appraised values and recovery prices for a large sample of manufactured homes
in the United States. Our purpose has been to try to understand whether manual
appraisals are an adequate and cost-effective adjunct to the underwriting process
for mortgage lenders.
First, we show that simple hedonic models of prices at origination provide
surprisingly good explanation of purchase prices, especially when spatial au-
tocorrelation is included in the analysis. The year-ahead forecast performance
of these hedonic models improves with sophistication but erodes over time.
Our second set of results finds that recovery values are very different from
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origination prices. Recoveries are not a simple multiplicative transformation of
origination prices. One important result is the role of atypicality, which reverses
sign in the recovery price regressions. Illiquid homes sell for higher prices at
origination but for large discounts in a recovery. There is also heteroskedas-
ticity in the hedonic regressions related to the atypicality of the home. Atyp-
ical homes have a large bid–ask spread, and their prices are more difficult to
explain.
Finally, we test whether defaults are best explained by purchase prices, ap-
praised values, or recovery values. We find that indeed manual or book ap-
praisals are a valuable adjunct to the underwriting process. There is additional
information content to an appraisal for explaining defaults when the appraisal
(whether manual or hedonic) price is above the purchase price, but not when
below. We also find that expected recovery values have an effect on the default
decision.
We thank the editor, Tom Thibodeau, the anonymous reviewers and Kelly Pace
for their helpful comments and assistance.
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Appendix
Methodology
We use the following mixed regressive spatial autoregressive model:
Y = ρWY + Xβ + ε
ε ∼ N (0, σ 2 I )
(A.1)
where Y is an n × 1 vector of dependent variables, β is a K × 1 vector of
parameters associated with the exogenous variables X (n × K matrix), and ρ
is the coefficient of the spatially lagged dependent variable. The N × N matrix
W is a spatial weight matrix associated with a spatial autoregressive process in
the dependent variable.
Structure of the Spatial Weight Matrix
To illustrate the spatial weight matrix, consider the following figure showing
the spatial location of five observations. For simplicity, assume that we are only
concerned about the nearest neighbor.
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Clearly, 1 and 5 are nearest neighbors to each other as are 2 and 4. 5 is the
closest neighbor to 3. In a standardized spatial weight matrix, each row must
sum to 1. The ijth matrix entry will be a 1 if the nearest neighbor to the ith




0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1
0 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0


Note that W might not be symmetric. In this case, 5 is the closest neighbor to 3,
but the reciprocal is not true. Note also that the diagonal is zero. This is because




0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1
0 1 0 0 0























Now let us see what happens when we consider the two nearest neighbors and
weight them equally. The second nearest neighbor to 1 is 2 and vice versa. The
second nearest neighbor to 3 and 4 is 1, and the second nearest neighbor to 5 is
3. Now, W looks like:




0 1/2 0 0 1/2
1/2 0 0 1/2 0
1/2 0 0 0 1/2
1/2 1/2 0 0 0
1/2 0 1/2 0 0






0 1/2 0 0 1/2
1/2 0 0 1/2 0
1/2 0 0 0 1/2
1/2 1/2 0 0 0























So, WY is just an average of the dependent variable of the two nearest neighbors.
If we give the nearest neighbor a weight of 2/3, and the second nearest neighbor




0 1/3 0 0 2/3
1/3 0 0 2/3 0
1/3 0 0 0 2/3
1/3 2/3 0 0 0























which is a weighted average of the dependent variable of the two nearest
neighbors.
In the current study, we restricted the rows of the spatial weight matrix, W, to
sum to 1. Because we only wanted to model the influence of previously sold
neighboring homes, we chose the 15 nearest observations occurring within the









if j is the lth nearest observation to i, and l ≤ 15
0 otherwise
Because most of the entries of W are zero, we were able to use sparse matrix rou-
tines, which saved a considerable amount of computational space. We dropped
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the first year of observations after creating the spatial weight matrix. We did
this because the estimator could perform poorly initially, as it would have a
very small selection of previously sold neighbors to use in the first predictions.
Maximum Likelihood Estimation:
Equation (A.1) can be represented as:
Ay = Xβ + ε (A.2)
where A = I − ρW.
Solving for ε, we get:
Ay − Xβ = ε. (A.3)
This is a nonlinear expression where ε is a vector of independent normal error
terms. Although the error term has a well-behaved joint distribution, it cannot
be observed, and the likelihood function has to be based on y. Therefore, it is
necessary to introduce the concept of a Jacobian, which allows us to derive the
joint distribution for the y from that for the ε. The Jacobian for the transformation
of the vector of random variables ε into the vector of random variables y is:
J = det(∂ε/∂y) = |A| = |I − ρW |. (A.4)
The density function of a joint normal distribution with mean zero and variance
σ 2I is:
f (ε) = 1







Using the change of variable technique with Equations (A.3), (A.4) and (A.5),
we can find the density function for y:
f (y) = 1





(Ay − Xβ)′(Ay − Xβ)
}
· |I − ρW |. (A.6)
Taking natural logarithms of both sides, we get the following log-likelihood
function:














(Ay − Xβ)′(Ay − Xβ) + ln |I − ρW |. (A.7)
In general, maximizing the log-likelihood of y would amount to minimizing
the sum of squared errors, (Ay − Xβ)′/(Ay − Xβ), were it not for the term
involving the determinant of the Jacobian. However, in our case W is lower
triangular with zeros on the diagonal, so A = I − ρW is lower triangular with
ones on the diagonal. The determinant of a lower triangular matrix is simply
the product of the elements of its diagonal. Therefore, the log-determinant of A
is 0. So, due to the structure of the spatial weight matrix, ordinary least squares
is the maximum likelihood estimate.
Atypicality
Following Haurin (1988), we created a variable to account for the difficulty that
arises in valuing homes with unusual features. We use implicit marginal prices
from a price hedonic regression of home sales prices on various characteristics to
penalize absolute deviations from the average. We then aggregate these values.
Our measure of atypicality for the ith home is as follows:
ATYPi = |PAREA(AREAi − AREA)| + |PAGE(AG Ei − AG E)|
+ |PDMULTI(DMULTI − DMULTI)| (A.8)
where PAREA = 0.00063446, PAGE = −0.00257 and PDMULTI = 0.34933 are
implicit marginal prices obtained from a regression of log of real purchase
price on AREA, AGE and DMULTI, and where ARE A, AG E and DMU LT I
are the sample means for area, home age and for the multi-wide dummy variable,
respectively.
Glejser Test
We use the Glejser test (Glejser 1969, Schwert and Seguin 1990) to detect
heteroskedasticity in our model. In the first stage, we estimate the model:
yi = ρwi Y + xiβ + εi
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We then use the residuals from this regression, e = Y − Ŷ , in a Glejser
regression:
(π/2)1/2|e| = Xβ + v. (A.10)
We use (π/2)1/2|e| as an estimate of the standard deviation of e. If ei ∼
N(0, σ 2i ), then E[(π/2)
1/2|ei |] = σi . So, we are regressing the estimated vari-
ance on our independent variables. We find that the variable atypicality is the
source of the heteroskedasticity, and we run a weighted least squares regression
(WLS) of the model in Equation (A.9) using atypicality as the weight.
